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COMMENTS
EQUITY-HARDSHI-DECLINE OF PURCHASING POWER OF THE
DOLLAR.
In a suit in equity by a vendor of land against her broker, his
real estate agency, and the purchaser and her guardian to set
aside the deed, it was established that the broker had failed to
inform the vendor that the purchaser was the broker's mother-
in-law.' The Supreme Court of Missouri held that there had been
such fraudulent non-disclosure of the relationship between the
broker and purchaser as would ordinarily create a right to can-
cellation. However, the court took judicial notice of the steady
and material decline of the purchasing power of the dollar 2 in
the twenty-three month interval3 between the transaction and
the institution of the suit, during which time the purchaser had
become incompetent. As a consequence of this decline the re-
funded purchase-money would have represented to the defendant
purchaser's guardian "only a fraction of its value at the time
of the sale."4 Because of this hardship to the defendant pur-
chaser, the court in its discretion denied cancellation, but allowed
recovery of the broker's fee with interest. It should be noted that
the decision does not rest wholly upon the ground of the decline
in value of the dollar, but was also influenced by the fact that
the purchaser had become incompetent. This discussion, how-
ever, will center upon the availability of inflation as a discretion-
ary defense in equity.
Discretionary Defenses in General
The discretionary defenses, an outgrowth of the "extra-legal"
powers of the chancellor in the original equity courts, seem some-
what unsuited to our modern jurisprudence, in which the dis-
1. Currotto v. Hammack, 241 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. 1951).
2. Judicial notice by an appellate court of changes in dollar value has
been especially frequent in recent years, but the issue is usually that of
determining whether damages have been excessive. Gluckstein v. Lipsett,
98 Cal.App.2d 391 209 P.2d 98 (1949) ("one half of value prior to infla-
tion") ; Owens v. Green, 400 Ill. 380, 81 N.E.2d 149 (1948) (impressive in-
crease in real estate values at time of principal case); Cruce v. Gulf, Mobile
& Ohio R.I., 361 Mo. 1138, 239 S.W.2d 674 (1951) (one of numerous
Missouri cases); McCoRMICK, DAMAGES §§ 48, 49 (1935).
3. 1945-1947.
4. Currotto v. Hammack, 241 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Mo. 1951).
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tinction between law and equity has been nearly wiped out. As
Pound asks, why should the same judge be more or less callous
on one docket than on another?5 The exercise of discretion is
none the less a safety-valve, needed to alleviate the rigor and
thoroughness of equitable remedies such as specific performance
or cancellation.6
The dangers in the exercise of equitable discretion are that
the rules governing its exercise may be so strict as to be worth-
less, or so loose as to impair the security of contracts. If the
judge must follow set rules, he loses the very power of discretion
which is needed. On the other hand, if there are no rules, then
he may, in effect, change any contract on a whim. The delibera-
tions of judges and writers indicate that they are concerned with
these dangers, especially the latter. They state repeatedly, often
in the language of Chancellor Kent in Seymour v. Delancey,T
that although the circumstances of each case are to be taken into
account, the discretion must be "judicial" and not "arbitrary and
capricious."'8 Any attempt to formulate a set of judicial rules for
the exercise of the courts' discretion, however, meets with limited
success at best. Courts are prone to confine their remarks to
generalities and to the facts involved, being unwilling and,
usually, unable to cite cases or fix principles which would be a
guide in determining what kind or degree of hardship might be
successfully urged as a defense in a future case.
The Defense of Hardship
It has often been stated that the availability of the defense
of hardship is usually conditioned upon some wrongdoing or
error on the part of the plaintiff and that the defense cannot be
raised successfully if the contract was fair and just in its in-
ception. Some courts have also held it applicable when the con-
tract was fair in its terms, but a factor outside of the action of
the parties, though existing at the time of the execution of the
5. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOsOPHY OF LAW 130-133 (1922).
6. Ibid.
7. 6 Johns. Ch. 222 (N.Y. 1822). Although the Chancellor's decision that
inadequacy of consideration alone is a defense was reversed by a split de-
cision of the Court for the Correction of Errors [Seymour v. Delancey,
3 Cow. 445 (N.Y. 1824) J, the case is often cited in support of Kent's dis-
cussion of judicial discretion in equity.
8. See note 7 supra. See also several excerpts in CHAFFnE, CASES ON
EQUITY 749-750 (1951).
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contract, later appears to work a hardship on the defendant."
On the other hand, it has been stated that any factors arising
after the execution of the contract are deemed to have been
within the contemplation of the parties and do not, therefore,
give rise to the defense.- Pomeroy suggests an extension which
reconciles most of the better decisions: if the performance of
the contract would work a hardship on the defendant because of
some unfairness which arises either at or after the execution of
the contract, the defense may successfully be raised, unless the
subsequent hardship could reasonably have been foreseen by the
contracting parties." Changes in the value of the subject-matter
of the contract or of the consideration usually fall within this
latter category,'12 although some unusual circumstance may
create an unforeseeable hardship situation.13 Pomeroy's pro-
posal supplies a set of rules, but these are open to so many differ-
ent interpretations when the problem of applying them to vari-
ous factual situations arises that they constitute a rather shaky
foundation.
Willard v. Tayloe
A leading case in the hardship field, Willard v. Tayloe, " bears
not a little resemblance to the principal case. An optionee who
proffered legal tender notes in payment was denied specific per-
formance of a land contract, since these notes had only about
one-half the purchasing power of the only tender current at the
time the option was given. The United States Supreme Court
held that, although the parties must usually assume the risk of
fluctuations in value, nevertheless in this case the optionee might
have specific performance only upon tender of gold, because of an
unusual circumstance, the passage of the Legal Tender Acts and
the subsequent inflation of the notes. The Court discussed the
nature of the defense of hardship generally, and concluded by
quoting the maxim, "Whilst he seeks equity he must do equity.' ' "5
9. As, for example, an underground stream of water which, unknown
to the vendee, flowed under the property. Kleinberg v. Rattett, 252 N.Y.
236, 169 N.E. 289 (1929).
10. See Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339 (U.S. 1870); Southern Ry. v.
Franklin & Pittsylvania R.R., 96 Va. 693, 32 S.E. 485 (1899).
11. POMEROY, SPECIC PERFORMANCE §§ 177, 178, 178(a) (3rd ed. 1926).
12. Franklin Tel. Co. v. Harrison, 145 U.S. 459 (1892) (great rise in
value due to natural growth of cities).
13. Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557 (U.S. 1869).
14. Ibid.
15. Id. at 574.
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It should be noted that this case constitutes an exception to
the general rule that changes in value of subject matter or con-
sideration are to be treated as reasonably foreseeable by the
parties. The decision was handed down in the same term as that
in Hepburn v. Griswold,8 which held the Legal Tender Acts un-
constitutional when applied to pre-existing debts. Shortly there-
after, the Court, the personnel having changed, overruled the
latter stand in the Legal Tender Cases.Y It also pronounced the
oft-quoted dictum of Marble Co. v. Ripley,8 that if a contract
be fair at its inception, the defense of hardship will not be al-
.lowed because of changed conditions. In making this pronounce-
ment, the Court made no reference to Willard v. Tayloe.
The Principal Case
It is evident that the decision reached in the principal case
operates as a "safety-valve" which protects a defendant pur-
chaser from hardship. The result seems consistent with equitable
principles, since it was not claimed that the defendant partici-
pated in the fraudulent act but only in its benefit. In addition,
although the application of discretionary defenses to a suit for
cancellation of a deed involves the same principles as those dealt
with in a suit for specific performance,"" the former type of
action is usually viewed as a more serious matter-a remedy to
be given more cautiously-than the latter.20
On the other hand, the defense was here judicially recognized
by a court of last resort although not urged by counsel in their
briefs,21 and was used as a major factor in the decision in a
rather casual manner, without citation of authorities. It further
appears to have been a broad extension of the doctrine of equi-
table discretion; the contract was fair at its inception (so far
as the plaintiff's conduct was concerned), and the hardship re-
sulted from a subsequent change in the value of the consideration.
Even if Willard v. Tayloe be relied upon, one must remember that
over three-quarters of a century of economic and fiscal change
16. 8 Wall. 603 (U.S. 1869).
17. 12 Wall. 457 (U.S. 1870).
18. 10 Wall. 339 (U.S. 1870).
19. Lariviere v. Larocque, 105 Vt. 460, 168 Atl. 559 (1933); Note, 91
A.L.R. 1521 (1934).
20. See note 19 supra; Wagner v. Hickey, 232 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. 1950).
21. Briefs for Appellant and Respondents (No. 41,893), Currotto v.
Hammack, 241 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. 1951).
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separate that case from the principal one. The use of paper
money has long ceased to be a legal issue, and does not affect the
principal case as it did the former one. In addition, cyclic infla-
tion and deflation make the change in monetary value quite fore-
seeable, thereby further distinguishing the two cases.
Conclusion
While the decision in the principal case may be supported as
being equitable in view of the facts involved, it does not suggest
the general availability of hardship caused by the decline of the
purchasing power of the dollar as a discretionary defense in
equity. First, it is not the sole ground on which the decision in
the case rests. Second, although the court was liberal in its ex-
tension of equitable discretion in this case,22 such liberality as
here displayed is open to charges of being arbitrary and capri-
cious, and of going beyond accepted practice, as described above.
Finally, if the defense were developed into a consistently applied
legal theory it would go a long way toward tying the courts to
the administrative agencies which determine price indices.
JOHN M. DRESCHER, JR.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-RIGHT OF CHILD TO SUE PARENTS FOR
AN INTENTIONAL TORT.
Plaintiff, an unemancipated minor child, sued her deceased
father's estate for damages (for mental pain and suffering)
resulting from the father's killing plaintiff's mother in plaintiff's
presence and then a week later committing suicide, also in plain-
tiff's presence. The child was the illegitimate offspring of the
deceased persons.' A Maryland appellate court reversing the
lower court's sustaining of defendant's demurrer declared:
... where the parent is guilty of acts which show complete
abandonment of the parental relation, the rule giving him
immunity from suit by the child, on the ground that disci-
22. Another interesting example of Missouri liberality in the field of
hardships is Rockhill Tennis Club v. Volker, 331 Mo. 947, 156 S.W.2d 9(1932), noted in 47 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1933) as the "first case where a
court of equity has declared civic beauty of sufficient importance to warrant
a denial of specific performance," and one wherein the court had to de-
termine what constituted beauty under the facts of the case.
1. The court gives no consideration to the fact that the child was illegiti-
mate; rather it treats the father as the legitimate parent.
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